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We test whether the relationship between ¯nance and growth is present in 48 countries over 20
di®erent periods of an equal length of 15 years, starting in 1980 (to 1995) and ending in 1999 (to
2014). We estimate growth regressions using an IV approach and we ¯nd that (1) overall
¯nancial development had a positive e®ect on economic growth for almost all our studied
periods, (2) the legal system is the primary determinant of the e®ectiveness of the overall
¯nancial system, and (3) ¯nancial services were relevant for economic growth even during the
¯nancial crisis of 2008. This research is part of a research agenda revisiting the ¯nance–growth
nexus using up-to-date empirical methodologies.
Keywords: Financial structure; economic growth; ¯nancial development.
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1. Introduction
We empirically re-visit the ¯nance–growth nexus. The reason for this re-visitation is
the primacy of the economic growth question for economics. Religion,a inequality,b
aReligion may explain di®erences in economic growth across regions (Landes 1999) and across European
cities between 1500 and 1750 (Dudley & Blum 2001) and may determine economic development (McCleary
& Barro 2006), investor protection (Stulz & Williamson 2003), economic attitude (Guiso et al. 2003), risk
aversion (Hilary & Hui 2010), and entrepreneurship (Audretsch et al. 2007, Braggion et al. 2009).
b In order to maintain their hold on power, wealthy elites may prevent the sound development of insti-
tutions conducive to economic growth such as schools, courts, and banks, thus impairing economic de-
velopment (Engerman & Sokolo® 1997, Glaeser et al. 2003, Sonin 2003, Berkowitz & Clay 2011, Rajan &
Ramcharan 2011, Acemoglu & Robinson 2013, pp. 152–158).
This is an Open Access article published by World Scienti¯c Publishing Company. It is distributed under
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laws and institutions, including schools, courts and \banks", are among the often
investigated drivers of local entrepreneurship,c and economic growth. So, an
assessment of how ¯nance a®ects growth remains topical.
To accomplish our re-visitation, we analyze the ¯nance–growth nexus for 48
countries in various time windows over the period of 1980–2014. Using Two-Stage
Least-Square (TSLS), we test the impact of overall ¯nancial services provided by
¯nancial institutions (banks, stock market, and other ¯nancial institutions) on
economic growth (¯nancial services view). Second, we employ an Instrumental
Variable (IV) approach to test whether the legal system exerts a positive e®ect in the
¯nance and growth relationship (legal and ¯nance view). We consider 20 periods of
15 years (starting in 1980–1995 and ending in 1999–2014) to evaluate if the ¯nance–
growth nexus of the early periods persists in the last periods of our rolling window
sample.
In the theory of ¯nance–growth, there are two opposite points of view. Bagehot
(1873) and Hicks (1969) for example posit that ¯nance–growth nexus promoted the
mobilization of capital at the beginning of the England industrialization, while
Schumpeter (1911) argues that ¯nancial intermediation provided by banks promotes
innovation and economic development. However, other authors disagree with them.
Lucas (1988) for example rejects the idea that ¯nance matters for economic growth,
while Robinson (1952) claims that ¯nance only follows economic development.
But, in 1969, Goldsmith is the ¯rst to empirically document positive correlations
between ¯nancial development and GDP per capita. He uses the assets of ¯nancial
intermediaries relative to GNP and the sum of the net issues of bonds and securities
plus changes in loans relative to GNP as ¯nancial development data. However, he
had no means to control for other factors associated with economic growth that could
be driven by other country characteristics correlated with both ¯nance and growth
and/or provide any inference on the direction of causality between ¯nance and
growth (Beck 2009).
In the early 1990s, more data and country characteristics became available. In
their seminal paper, King & Levine (1993) add ¯nancial sector measures to the
standard cross-sectional framework explaining economic growth. They run a cross-
section of 80 countries for the period of 1960–1989 and they conclude that ¯nance
matters for growth. They also ¯nd that ¯nancial development helps to predict the
rate of economic growth of countries for the following 10–30 years. Their results are
consistent with Schumpeter's view: \services provided by ¯nancial intermediaries
stimulate long run growth" (op. cit., p. 1).
The early ¯nance and growth literature uses standard cross-country OLS
regressions (references), but they are only consistent if the orthogonality condition
cStarting with Schumpeter and until more recently, entrepreneurship is considered an important com-
ponent of economic growth (Schumpeter 1934, Aghion & Howitt 1992, Akcigit & Kerr 2018), and it is
therefore no surprise that the study of its determinants has gained attention in the academic literature
(e.g. Dunne et al. 1988, Glaeser & Kerr 2009, Kerr & Nanda 2010).





















































































































prevails. Beck (2009) explains that the classical approach to overcome the biases
related to OLS is to identify and instrument as to isolate that part of the variation in
the endogenous variable that is not associated with reverse causation, omitted
variables, and measurement error (op. cit., p. 6).
In 2001, Beck et al. (2001) run IV regressions to test the ¯nancial services and
the law and ¯nance's view. Based on the work by La Porta et al. (1998), they take
instruments of the legal origin of countries (English Common Law, French, Ger-
man and Scandinavian Civil Law), the protection of corporate shareholders (anti-
director) and creditors (creditor), and the quality of their enforcement (rule of
law). They also consider the work of Rajan & Zingales (1998) to test whether
industries that depend more heavily on external ¯nance grow faster. And once
more they ¯nd strong evidence of both the ¯nancial services and law and ¯nance
views.d
While the evidence on the link between ¯nance and growth has further expanded
during the last few decades (Table 1), the Global Financial Crisis has re-opened the
debate on whether beyond some level of ¯nancial depth, there is \too much ¯nance",
i.e. there are no more positive bene¯ts to further growth in ¯nance due to increasing
¯nancial fragility and macroeconomic instability (Loayza et al. 2018). They also call
for an \integrated approach" that recognized the existence of a trade-o® associated
with the dual e®ect of policies fostering ¯nancial development, potentially leading to
both higher growth and higher crisis risk.
Beck (2018) for example highlights that in the past 20 years, the empirical evi-
dence on one hand supports the idea that ¯nancial sector deepening is a critical part
of any successful economic development process, but on the other hand the banking
crisis literature has identi¯ed rapid credit growth as a good predictor of systemic
banking distress. Consequently, Arcand et al. (2015) examine whether there is a
threshold above which ¯nancial depth no longer has a positive e®ect on economic
growth. They show that ¯nancial depth starts having a negative e®ect on output
growth when credit to the private sector reaches 100% of GDP. Their results are
consistent with the \vanishing e®ect" of ¯nancial depth found by Rousseau &
Wachtel (2011).
Since a systemic risk perspective, the World Bank (2013) points that ¯nancial
system supports risk management by o®ering various ¯nancial toolse to people and
their support systems (Households, the community, enterprises, the state, and even
the international community), but the systemic risk could arise from the procyclicalf
d\Economies grow faster, industries depending heavily on external ¯nance expand at faster rates, new
¯rms form more easily, ¯rm's access to external ¯nancing is easier, and ¯rms grow more rapidly in
economies with higher levels of overall ¯nancial-sector development and in countries with legal systems
that more e®ectively protect the rights of outside investors" (Beck et al. 2001, p. 233).
e\For example, payment and foreign exchange services, saving instruments (bank deposits and liquid
securities), credit, market insurance, debt and equity investments, risk-taking capital, public trading of
assets, and risk pricing information" (World Bank 2013, p. 194).
f\Not only do the ¯nancial and real cycles move together but banking crises can spill over to macroeco-






















































































































Table 1. Evidence of ¯nancial structure and economic growth.
Level of analysis Model
Paper
Countries-
industries Period Country Industry Firm OLS IV Source Results
Goldsmith (1969) 35 1860–1963 Yes Yes Authors' data Positive correlation between ¯nancial
structure and economic growth.
King & Levine
(1993)
80 1960–1989 Yes Yes Authors' data Financial development is strongly associ-
ated with economic growth, ¯nancial
development precedes growth, and its
positive associated with both invest-
ment rate and the e±ciency with
which economies use capital.
La Porta et al.
(1998)
49 1998 Yes Yes Authors' data Countries with legal origin in common law
tend to protect investors more than
the countries based on civil law.
Rajan & Zingales
(1998)
42–36 1980–1990 Yes Yes Yes Yes Standard and Poor's Compu-
stat (1994)
Industrial sectors that are relatively more
in need of external ¯nance develop
faster in countries with more devel-
oped ¯nancial markets.
Beck et al. (2001) a. 48 1980–1995 Yes Yes Yes World Bank; OECD; GFDD;
Barro & Lee (1996)
Higher level of ¯nancial development and
legal systems that protect the rights of
outside investors have a positive e®ect
over economic growth.
Beck et al. (2001) b. 34–36 1980–1989 Yes Yes Yes World Bank; OECD; GFDD;
Barro & Lee (1996); ISY-
UN
Industries that depend relatively more on
external ¯nance grow faster in econo-
mies with higher levels of ¯nancial de-
velopment and legal systems that
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Table 1. (Continued )
Level of analysis Model
Paper
Countries-
industries Period Country Industry Firm OLS IV Source Results
Beck et al. (2001) c. 33 1990–1995 Yes Yes Accounting data for the largest
publicly traded
manufacturing ¯rms
New ¯rms form more easily, ¯rms' access
to external ¯nancing is easier and ¯rms
grow more rapidly in economies with a
higher level of ¯nancial sector devel-
opment.
Beck et al. (2012) 45 1994–2005 Yes Yes Yes World Bank WDI, Beck et al.
(2007, 2010), La Porta et al.
(1999)
There is a positive and signi¯cant rela-
tionship between enterprise credit and
GDP per capita growth, but also that




84 1960–2004 World Bank WDI 2007 edition. The ¯nance–growth relationship that was
estimated with data from 1960 to 1989
disappeared over the subsequent
15 years.
Beck et al. (2014) 77 1980–2007 Yes Yes World Bank WDI, United
Nations. Barro & Lee
(1996), and KLEMS.
Financial intermediation is positively as-
sociated with growth and negatively
with growth volatility; however, both
e®ects have become weaker over time.
Arcand et al. (2015) 45 1960–2010 Yes Yes Yes World BankWDI (2011), Barro
& Lee (2010), Beck et al.
(2000, 2010, 2012), and
authors' data
Financial depth starts having a negative
e®ect on output growth when credit to




17 1870–1929 Yes Yes Authors' data Deepening episodes signi¯cantly enhanced
the standard ¯nance–growth dynamic,
while deepening associated with ¯-
nancial crises sharply hindered it.
Notes: World Bank national accounts data. OECD National Accounts data ¯les. Global Financial Development Database (GFDD). Industrial Statistics Yearbook
database by United Nations (ISYD-UN). Global Development Indicators (GDI). KLEMS is a worldwide initiative based on a growth accounting framework. Beck
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and the interconnectednessg nature of the ¯nancial system, and from the possibility
of contagionh.
We \wade into" this work on the ¯nance–growth relationship by more compre-
hensively revisiting the assessment of the impact of ¯ve ¯nancial development
indicators on economic growth over 20 consequent 15-year periods (1980–1995,
1981–1996,. . ., 1999–2014). We estimate growth regressions using an IV approach.
We ¯nd that (1) overall ¯nancial development had a positive e®ect on economic
growth for almost all our periods, (2) the legal system is the primary determinant of
the e®ectiveness of the overall ¯nancial system, and (3) ¯nancial services were rel-
evant for economic growth even during the ¯nancial crisis of 2008. This is an initial
exploration of the relationship between ¯nancial development and economic growth
in recent decades. We are leaving issues of the ¯nancial structure and the ¯nancial
crisis e®ect on economic growth for future research.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature. Sec-
tion 3 introduces the estimated models and data. Section 4 presents the estimates.
Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature Review
Our research to understand the role of ¯nancial system in economic growth is based
on the functional approach as in Levine (1997) and Levine (2005). He describes the
¯ve functions of ¯nancial systems needed to reach ¯nancial development: \1) pro-
duce information ex ante about possible investments and allocate capital, 2) monitor
investments and exert corporate governance after providing ¯nance, 3) facilitate the
trading, diversi¯cation, and management of risk, 4) mobilize and pool saving and 5)
ease the exchange of goods and services" (Levine 2005, p. 869). Hence, when ¯nancial
development occurs, ¯nancial instruments, markets, and intermediaries ameliorate
the e®ects of information, enforcement, and transactions costs in providing the ¯ve
¯nancial functions and each one function promotes savings and investment decisions
and hence economic growth.
Levine (1997) warns about the di®erences between the functional and the al-
ternative money approach based on the seminal contributions of Gurley & Shaw
(1955), Tobin (1965) and McKinnon (1973). In his opinion, they focus on mathe-
matical models that can restrict the analysis of the ¯nance–growth nexus and lead to
a misleading distinction between the ¯nancial and real sectors. In contrast, the
functional approach highlights the value added by the ¯nancial sector to economic
growth. \The ¯nancial system is a `real' sector: it researches ¯rms and managers,
g\Interconnectedness of ¯nancial institutions can have a positive impact on ¯nancial development because
it promotes greater completeness of ¯nancial markets and better distribution of ¯nancial risks in normal
times. But the interconnected balance sheets of ¯nancial ¯rms, through their participation in joint ¯-
nancial infrastructure can spread a shock throughout the national and even international ¯nancial system
and sometimes amplify those shocks" (op cit., p. 205).
h\Contagion can cause runs on bank deposits, freezes of money and asset markets, or both" (op cit.,
p. 206)





















































































































exerts corporate control and facilitate risk management, ex-change, and resource
mobilization" Levine (1997, p. 689).
In the functional approach, ¯nancial markets and institutions may arise to
ameliorate the problems created by information and transactions frictions. But the
main and primary function of ¯nancial systems is \facilitate the allocation of
resources, across space and time, in an uncertain environment" (Merton &
Bodie 1995, p. 12). And, to be more speci¯c, Levine (1997) describes the channels
through which each ¯nancial functions may a®ect economic growth: capital accu-
mulation and technological innovation.i
There is another branch of this literature that explains the impact of ¯nancial
structure on economic growth: the bank-based and the market-based ones. The ¯rst
highlights that bank-based systems are better at mobilizing savings, identifying good
investments, and exerting sound corporate control, particularly during the early
stages of economic development and in weak institutional environments. On the
other hand, the market-based view emphasizes the advantages of markets in allo-
cating capital, providing risk-management tools, and mitigating the problems as-
sociated with excessively powerful banks (Levine 2005).
The literature of ¯nancial services is strongly linked with the ¯nancial structure
evidence because there is still a debate if all services of ¯nancial institutions, or only
banks or stock market services, have a positive e®ect on economic growth. Beck et al.
(2001) use di®erent datasets and econometric methodologies to assess the relation-
ship between ¯nancial structure and economic development and they reviewed the
bank-based view, the market-based view, the law and ¯nance, and the ¯nancial
services views. In the last two cases, it is not necessary the distinction between bank-
based or market-based ¯nancial structure and those approaches deny that ¯nancial
structure exerts in°uence on growth.
First, they estimate standard cross-country growth regressions to answer the
question: \Do countries with bank-based ¯nancial systems grow faster than countries
with market-based systems, or is ¯nancial structure unrelated to the pace of eco-
nomic development?" They explore the impact of ¯nancial structure on long-run
economic growth in a sample of 48 countries, with data averaged over the period of
1980–1995. They run an Ordinary Less Square (OLS) and IV regressions.
Second, they explore the impact of ¯nancial development and ¯nancial structure
on industry growth and new ¯rm creation based on an extension of the Rajan &
Zingales (1998) model. They use a country-industry panel of 34 countries and 36
i\On capital accumulation, one class of growth models uses either capital externalities or capital goods
produced using constant returns of scale but without the use of nonreproducible factors to generate steady-
state per capita growth (Romer 1986, Lucas 1988, Rebelo 1991). In these models, the functions performed
by the ¯nancial system a®ect steady-state growth by in°uencing the rate of capital formation. The
¯nancial system a®ects capital accumulation either by altering the savings rate or by reallocating savings
among di®erent capital producing technologies. On technological innovation, the second class of growth
models focuses on the inventions of new production processes and goods (Romer 1990, Grossman &
Helpman 1991, Aghion & Howitt 1992). In these models, the functions performed by the ¯nancial system






















































































































industries to test whether industries that depend more heavily on external ¯nance
grow faster in market- or bank-based ¯nancial systems, or whether it is the overall
level of ¯nancial development that is critical in accounting for cross-country di®er-
ences in industrial growth patterns. They again run OLS and IV models.
Third, they use ¯rm-level data from a panel of 33 countries and 6 years between
1990 and 1995 to explore whether ¯rms' access to external ¯nance varies across
¯nancial systems with di®erent structures, or whether the overall level of initial
development and legal system determine ¯rms' access to external ¯nance. They run
an IV regression on this account.
After comparing the three methodologies, Beck et al. (2001) conclude that ¯-
nancial structure (the di®erence between bank-based and market-based systems) is
not an analytically useful way to distinguish the relationship between ¯nance and
economic growth, and they argue that the law and ¯nance and the ¯nancial services
views are more useful to understand the impact of ¯nance on economic growth.
The law and ¯nance view is based on the La Porta et al. (1998) work which shows
that national legal origin strongly in°uences the legal and regulatory environment
governing ¯nancial sector transactions. They explain that in general, commercial laws
come from two broad traditions: common law, which is English in origin, and civil law,
which derives from Roman law. Within the civil tradition, there are three major
families that modern commercial laws originate from French, German, and Scandi-
navian. They also argue that the quality of law enforcement is the highest in Scandi-
navian and German civil law countries, the next highest in common law countries and
the lowest in French civil law countries. Finally, they suggest that the French and the
German civil traditions as well as the common law tradition (British) have spread
around theworld through a combination of conquest, imperialism, outright borrowing,
and more subtle imitation. Since legal origin explains cross-country di®erences in
¯nancial intermediary development and since legal origin is (reasonably) exogenous,
Levine et al. (2000) use this set as IV to control for the simultaneity bias.
Also based on the La Porta et al. (1998) data, the empirical literature often
includes three indicators of the rights of outside investors and the degree to which
these rights are enforced. Creditor is an index of the degree to which the legal codes of
the country protect the claims of secured creditors in the case of reorganization or
liquidation of a company,j and it ranges from 0 to 4. The authors explain that for
jCreditor is the sum of four dummy variables that indicate whether (1) the reorganization procedure does not
impose an automatic stay on assets, thereby not preventing secured creditors from taking possession of loan
collateral, (2) secured creditors are ranked ¯rst in the case of liquidation, (3) management does not stay in
charge of the ¯rm during reorganization, thereby enhancing creditors' power, and (4) management needs
creditors' consent when ¯ling for reorganization.Anti-director is the sum of six dummy variables that indicate
whether (1) shareholders are allowed to mail their proxy vote to the ¯rm, (2) shareholders are not required to
deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholders' Meeting, (3) cumulative voting or proportional repre-
sentation ofminorities on the board of directors is allowed, (4) an oppressedminoritymechanism is in place, (5)
theminimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders'
Meeting is less than or equal to 10%, and (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can only bewaived by a
shareholders' vote.Rule of law use themeasure constructed by International Country RiskGuide (ICRG) and
is an average over the period (1982–1995) (Beck et al. 2001, p. 203).





















































































































higher values of creditor, outside investors have more rights relative to the man-
agement and other stakeholders and should therefore be more willing to provide the
external resources that ¯rms need. Anti-director is an index of the degree to which
the legal codes of the country protect minority shareholder rights, and it ranges from
0 to 6. In economies with higher values of anti-director, minority shareholders are
better protected against expropriation by management and large shareholders and
should therefore be more willing to provide external ¯nancing to ¯rms. Finally, rule
of law is an assessment of the law and order tradition of a country that ranges from
10, strong law and order tradition, to 1, weak law and order tradition. In countries
with a higher law and order tradition, outside investors can more easily enforce their
claims and rights and should therefore be more willing to provide external ¯nance.
In the last decade, the evidence of the ¯nance–growth nexus is more sophisti-
cated. The use of panel data models with large number of instruments and advanced
econometric models has enriched the empirical literature, but Wachtel's (2011)
points out that the ¯nance–growth nexus is driven by the within-country relation-
ships more than the between-countries e®ect; otherwise, the large impact of ¯nance
in growth could indicate that the econometric results do not adequately account for
reverse causality (op. cit., p. 479).
On the other hand, several studies show the negative impact of ¯nance on eco-
nomic growth. Beck et al. (2016) indicate that higher ¯nancial innovation is linked
with higher growth volatility among industries which depends on external ¯nancing
and higher bank losses during the recent crisis. Beck et al. (2014) also stress that over
shorter time horizons, a large ¯nancial sector in°uences growth but increase vola-
tility in high-income countries, but intermediation activities stabilize the economy in
the medium run. And they suggest being careful with the non-linearities in the
relationship between ¯nance and growth. They explain that traditional activity of
intermediation has declined because ¯nancial institutions have diversi¯ed into non-
lending activities. They mention that ¯nancial institutions have focused on propri-
etary trading, market making, provision of advisory services, insurance and other
non-interest income-generating activities, and they do not help to perform the ¯ve
¯nancial intermediation functions that generate economic growth (op. cit., p. 51).
Other concerns arise from the Global Financial Crisis. The crisis literature is at
least as rich and diverse as the ¯nance and growth literature, but in this document,
we only focus on the \too much ¯nance" idea and the vanishing growth e®ect of
¯nancial depth, or what Panizza (2014) calls the \new" literature of ¯nance and
economic development.k Rousseau & Wachtel (2011) use a rolling regressions tech-
nique to investigate the relationship between the level of ¯nancial development and
the impact of ¯nance with IV panel regressions for 20 countries. They ¯nd that
kPanizza (2014) also distinguishes between the traditional empirical literature (which started in the late
1960s during Goldsmith (1969)); the new-new of ¯nance and economic growth (who explores alternative
measures of ¯nancial development, i.e. non-intermediation ¯nancial activities, ¯nancial innovation and
allocation of talents); and the \unknown unknown" category (that study the relationship between state-






















































































































¯nancial deepening has a strong impact on growth, but also that the bene¯ts of
¯nancial deepening disappear in crisis episodes. They also warn that the ¯nance–
growth relationship is not as strong in recent data as it was in the original studies
from 1960 to 1989. Rousseau & Wachtel (2017) also examine historical data for 17
economies from 1870 to 1929 and conclude that deepening episodes, which they
de¯ne as increases of more than thirty percent in the ratio of M2 to GDP over a
period of 10 years, signi¯cantly enhanced the standard ¯nance–growth dynamic,
while deepening associated with ¯nancial crises sharply hindered it. Therefore,
Wachtel (2018) argues that some credit booms are good, because these promote
economic growth, while others are bad because they end in ¯nancial crises.
Arcand et al. (2015) use di®erent empirical approaches to show that there is a
positive and robust correlation between ¯nancial depth (credit to the private sector)
and economic growth in countries with small and intermediate ¯nancial sectors, but
also that there is a threshold (of around 80–120% of GDP) above which ¯nance starts
having a negative e®ect on economic growth. They consider two explanations to the
\vanishing e®ect": ¯rst, that something has changed in the fundamental relationship
between ¯nancial depth and growth and, second, that the true relationship between
¯nancial development and growth is non-monotonic. And they describe that non-
monotonicities might be driven by the increasing role of derivative ¯nancial products
and the rise of a shadow banking system.l According to Claessens et al. (2012), the
Global Financial Crisis has highlighted the systemic risks that shadow banking can
pose, because the securitization function to create private \safe" assets broke down
before the crisis and that had signi¯cant real and ¯nancial spillovers. The World
Bank (2013) also expresses its concerns about shadow banking in developing coun-
tries, where is necessary to ensure that shadow banks help provide alternative but
safe ¯nancial services, without generating unacceptable systemic risks.
Meanwhile, Beck (2018) considers another interpretation of the vanishing growth
e®ect of ¯nancial depth. He points that the insigni¯cant or even negative relationship
between ¯nance and growth also could be driven by two reasons: the di®erence in the
e®ect of household credit vs. ¯rm creditm and the di®erences between the ¯nancial
system size vs. services o®ered by them.n Our paper represents a step to further
enrich the empirical literature of whether ¯nancial development promotes economic
lGhosh et al. (2012) detail that shadow banking comprises a set of activities, markets, contracts, and
institutions that operate partially (or fully) outside the traditional commercial banking sector, and, as
such, are either lightly regulated or not regulated at all. They also explain that in advanced ¯nancial
systems, the players typically include money market, credit hedge, investment, and exchange-trading
funds; conduits or special purpose vehicles; and ¯nance, insurance, and leasing companies, whereas, in
emerging markets, the main participants in the shadow banking systems are ¯nance, leasing, and factoring
companies; investment and equity funds; insurance companies; pawn shops; and underground entities.
mBeck et al. (2012) ¯nd a positive and signi¯cant relationship between enterprise credit and GDP per
capita growth, but also that household credit enters insigni¯cantly across di®erent speci¯cations.
nBeck et al. (2014) ¯nd that intermediation activities increase growth but reduce volatility in the long run,
while an expansion of the ¯nancial sector along other dimensions has no long-run e®ect on real sector
outcomes. But, over shorter time horizons, a large ¯nancial sector stimulates growth at the cost of higher
volatility in high-income countries.





















































































































Table 2. Data de¯nitions and sources.
Name Variable de¯nition Source
Growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant 2010
US dollars. GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by
midyear population.
World Bank and OECD
Development Activity Log (total value of equity stock traded as share of GDP claims on private
sector by ¯nancial institutions as share of GDP).
GFDD World Bank
Development Size Log (equity market capitalizationþ claims on private sector by ¯nancial
institutions as share of GDP).
GFDD World Bank
Development E±ciency Log (total value of equity stock traded as share of GDP divided by bank's
overhead costs as share of total assets).
GFDD World Bank
Development Aggregate First principal component of Development Activity, Development Size,
and Development E±ciency.
GFDD World Bank
Development Dummy Takes value 0 if (claims on private sector by banks as share of
GDP þ value traded as share of GDP) are less than sample mean, 1
otherwise.
GFDD World Bank
Initial GDP GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the
economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included
in the value of the products. Data are in constant 2010 US dollars.
World Bank and OECD
Schooling Average years of total schooling. Barro and Lee (2011)
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Table 2. (Continued )
Name Variable de¯nition Source
Black market premium Formula: (parallel Xrate/o±cial Xrate 1) 100); values for industrial
countries are added as 0.
Levine & Renelt (1985, 1990–93); Adrian Wood
(1988); and Global Development Finance &
World Development Indicators (1996–1997).
Government General government ¯nal consumption expenditure (% of GDP). World Bank and OECD
Trade Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as
a share of gross domestic product. (% GDP).
World Bank and OECD
Creditor An index aggregating di®erent creditor rights, takes values from 1 to 4. Beck et al. (2001)
Anti-director An index aggregating the shareholder rights, takes values from 1 to 6. Beck et al. (2001)
Rule of law Measure of the law and order tradition of a country. It ranges from 10,
strong law and order tradition, to 1, weak law and order tradition. Is an
average over di®erent periods.
ICRG
British origin Takes the value 1 for countries with British legal origin, 0 otherwise. Beck et al. (2001)
French origin Takes the value 1 for countries with French legal origin, 0 otherwise. Beck et al. (2001)
German origin Takes the value 1 for countries with German legal origin, 0 otherwise. Beck et al. (2001)
Scandinavian origin Takes the value 1 for countries with Scandinavian legal origin, 0
otherwise.
Beck et al. (2001)
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growth. We continue the work of Beck et al. (2001) and we test the impact of overall
¯nancial services and the legal environment on economic growth using cross-country
regressions. We take a longer period, from 1980 to 2014, and we consider 20 windows
of 15 years (starting in 1980–1995 and ending in 199–2014) to capture the cross-
country di®erences and their changes over time with a rolling window technique.
3. Estimated Models and Data
3.1. Estimated models
We assess the impact of ¯nancial development on economic growth in a sample of 48
countries with data averaged over the period of 1980–2014. We estimate the fol-




Xi þ FDi þ "i; ð3:1Þ
where Growth is the average annual growth rate of real per capita GDP, X is a set of
potential growth determinants, FD is a set of ¯nancial development indicators, and "
is the error term. We leave the description of each ¯nancial development indicator to
the next section.












1 Argentina 4.15 3.23 −0.55 −2.29 0
2 Australia 8.11 5.01 3.25 1.26 1
3 Austria 6.50 4.64 1.50 0.04 1
4 Belgium 6.51 4.57 2.16 0.17 0
5 Brazil 6.24 4.25 0.77 −0.55 0
6 Canada 8.48 5.35 3.03 1.56 1
7 Chile 6.35 5.04 1.12 0.21 0
8 China 8.48 4.86 3.81 1.40 1
9 Colombia 4.43 4.03 −0.96 −1.70 0
10 Cyprus 7.35 5.13 1.08 0.53 1
11 Denmark 7.67 4.87 2.48 0.81 1
12 Ecuador 1.81 3.35 −3.29 −3.60 0
13 Egypt 5.97 4.15 1.96 −0.36 0
14 Finland 8.16 4.89 3.91 1.37 1
15 France 7.91 4.86 2.88 0.98 1
16 Germany 8.13 4.84 3.05 1.07 1
17 Ghana 1.13 2.87 −6.28 −5.02 0
18 Greece 6.71 4.51 1.65 0.04 0
19 Honduras 0.00 5.85 0.00 −1.17 1
20 India 6.74 4.32 2.46 0.12 1
21 Ireland 6.85 4.88 3.14 0.79 1
22 Israel 7.06 4.70 1.93 0.35 0
23 Italy 7.45 4.54 2.44 0.48 1


































































































































1 Argentina 4.42 3.02 −0.76 −0.98 0.00
2 Australia 6.29 4.46 1.58 0.97 1
3 Austria 5.94 4.48 0.65 0.63 1
4 Belgium 4.80 4.16 0.09 −0.04 0
5 Brazil 4.35 3.57 −1.47 −0.90 0
6 Canada 7.01 5.10 1.71 1.56 1
7 Chile 5.26 4.77 0.23 0.46 0
8 China 6.31 4.35 1.98 1.03 1
9 Colombia 2.98 3.59 −2.43 −1.56 0
10 Cyprus 4.41 4.56 −1.42 −0.35 1
11 Denmark 5.23 4.01 0.41 0.10 0
12 Ecuador 1.82 3.24 −3.14 −2.29 0
13 Egypt 2.50 3.41 1.25 −1.49 0
14 Finland 5.62 4.47 0.94 0.60 1
15 France 6.24 4.59 0.38 0.70 1












25 Japan 9.15 5.49 4.01 2.13 1
26 Kenya 3.39 3.78 −1.52 −2.34 0
27 Malaysia 7.95 5.42 3.14 1.51 1
28 Mexico 4.78 3.66 0.39 −1.51 0
29 Netherlands 8.50 5.08 4.05 1.65 1
30 New Zealand 6.43 4.76 1.58 0.14 1
31 Norway 7.40 4.66 2.58 0.60 1
32 Pakistan 6.44 3.73 2.23 0.49 1
33 Panama 3.75 4.47 −1.19 −1.60 0
34 Peru 4.02 3.82 −0.67 −1.89 0
35 Philippines 5.76 4.41 0.99 −0.49 0
36 Portugal 7.39 4.80 2.38 0.65 1
37 South Africa 8.00 5.55 2.10 1.33 1
38 Spain 8.61 5.15 3.30 1.52 1
39 Sri Lanka 4.01 3.66 −0.49 −1.97 0
40 Sweden 8.60 5.11 3.42 1.52 1
41 Switzerland 9.81 5.64 4.52 2.58 1
42 Thailand 8.01 5.03 2.75 1.10 1
43 Trinidad and Tobago 4.16 4.45 −0.85 −1.41 0
44 Tunisia 4.52 4.28 −0.45 −1.34 0
45 Turkey 6.39 3.75 1.78 −0.61 1
46 United Kingdom 8.76 5.34 3.39 1.73 1
47 United States 9.75 5.44 3.61 2.14 1
48 Zimbabwe 6.21 5.31 0.71 0.27 0
Notes: We use the countries considered by Beck et al. (2001).





















































































































We use the IV approach with TSLS to estimate equation (1) for 20 periods of 15
years each one. We take the cross-country model of Beck et al. (2001) as our point of
departure, with the same number of countries (48) and starting with the same period
of 1980–1995. Then we move the period of 15 years, one year at a time, until our last
we reach our end of sample period; so, we have the periods 1981–1996, 1982–1997,
1983–1998,. . ., and 1999–2014.
We consider legal origin (dummies), creditor, anti-director, and rule of law as IV
for ¯nancial development to extract the component of ¯nance that is de¯ned by the
legal system. We also examine the appropriateness of the instruments with Wool-
dridge (1995)'s robust score test of overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is
that our instruments are valid. We can interpret this result as indicating that our












16 Germany 7.23 4.65 1.74 1.39 1
17 Ghana 0.34 2.68 −7.84 −4.29 0
18 Greece 4.20 3.82 −0.74 −0.62 0
19 Honduras 0.00 3.60 0.00 −1.81 1
20 India 5.03 3.78 0.82 0.03 0
21 Ireland 6.76 0.00 3.27 −0.77 1
22 Israel 6.38 4.33 1.13 0.81 1
23 Italy 5.18 4.19 −0.04 0.05 1
24 Jamaica 4.27 3.93 −0.93 −0.59 0
25 Japan 8.61 5.40 3.27 2.62 1
26 Kenya 1.97 3.53 −2.35 −1.88 0
27 Malaysia 7.06 5.23 2.20 1.77 1
28 Mexico 4.38 3.34 −0.06 −0.63 0
29 Netherlands 6.73 4.68 2.46 1.46 1
30 New Zealand 5.74 4.44 0.90 0.61 0
31 Norway 6.03 4.44 0.95 0.71 1
32 Pakistan 2.52 3.63 −1.71 −1.49 0
33 Panama 0.33 4.02 −4.03 −2.57 0
34 Peru 3.21 2.93 −1.46 −1.58 0
35 Philippines 5.40 4.26 0.39 0.27 0
36 Portugal 5.09 4.21 0.14 0.09 1
37 South Africa 5.93 5.19 0.39 0.92 1
38 Spain 5.99 4.72 0.46 0.71 1
39 Sri Lanka 3.42 3.44 −0.92 −1.10 0
40 Sweden 6.91 4.84 1.25 1.27 1
41 Switzerland 9.59 5.26 7.74 4.04 1
42 Thailand 7.16 4.79 2.26 1.59 1
43 Trinidad and Tobago 3.72 3.94 −1.47 −0.90 0
44 Tunisia 3.73 4.13 −0.91 −0.65 1
45 Turkey 4.49 3.18 −0.02 −0.68 0
46 United Kingdom 7.36 4.91 2.27 1.72 1
47 United States 8.18 5.07 2.23 2.04 1
48 Zimbabwe 3.30 3.73 −0.93 −0.99 0






















































































































instruments a®ect real per capita GDP growth only through the ¯nancial develop-
ment indicators (Beck et al. 2001, p. 206)
3.2. Data
We assess the impact of ¯nancial development on economic growth in a sample of 48
countries took from di®erent sources. All data de¯nitions and sources are given in

























































Notes: This ¯gure shows the average values for 48 sample countries over the indicated time period.
Development Activity (DA) is de¯ned as the log of the product of total value of equity stock traded as
share of GDP and private credits by ¯nancial institutions as share of GDP. Growth is the annual per-
centage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant 2010 US dollars.
























































Notes: This ¯gure shows the average values for 48 sample countries over the indicated time period.
Development Activity (DA) is de¯ned as the log of the product of total value of equity stock traded as
share of GDP and private credits by ¯nancial institutions as share of GDP. Growth is the annual per-
centage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant 2010 US dollars.
Fig. 2. Financial development and growth (1999–2014).





















































































































GDP. Following (Beck et al. 2001), we use the following ¯ve indicators of ¯nancial
Development (FD):
(1) Development Activity is a measure of overall activity of ¯nancial intermediaries
and markets and it is de¯ned as the log of the product of Private Credit and
Equity Value Traded.
(2) Development Size is a measure of the overall size of the ¯nancial sector and is
de¯ned as the log of the sum of Private Credit and Equity Market Capitalization.










1 Argentina 18.93 4.39 10.95 5.70
2 Australia 75.00 44.45 74.81 1.52
3 Austria 86.58 7.69 17.44 1.85
4 Belgium 51.55 12.99 43.31 1.09
5 Brazil 36.61 14.09 33.52 5.21
6 Canada 105.95 45.37 102.18 2.12
7 Chile 64.60 8.76 88.98 2.83
8 China 96.35 50.81 33.46 1.13
9 Colombia 30.29 2.77 27.13 6.94
10 Cyprus 135.23 11.29 33.61 3.53
11 Denmark 91.18 23.43 39.58 1.45
12 Ecuador 21.80 0.28 6.78 7.10
13 Egypt 33.01 11.84 30.20 1.65
14 Finland 67.56 51.98 65.58 0.93
15 France 82.58 32.85 46.28 1.15
16 Germany 94.74 35.93 31.34 1.41
17 Ghana 7.70 0.40 9.89 6.98
18 Greece 54.62 14.95 36.62 2.79
19 Honduras 35.25 0.00 313.50 5.24
20 India 30.04 28.45 45.77 2.29
21 Ireland 78.44 12.00 52.28 0.60
22 Israel 63.67 18.25 45.94 2.36
23 Italy 63.63 27.05 30.54 2.08
24 Jamaica 23.02 2.24 48.03 7.95
25 Japan 166.48 54.13 70.58 0.89
26 Kenya 23.67 1.25 19.94 6.03
27 Malaysia 98.95 28.72 126.76 1.22
28 Mexico 18.68 6.35 20.21 4.48
29 Netherlands 92.43 53.07 64.64 1.02
30 New Zealand 78.44 7.94 38.92 1.47
31 Norway 81.01 23.32 35.22 1.56
32 Pakistan 22.61 27.59 18.97 2.98
33 Panama 63.15 0.65 23.24 2.69
34 Peru 17.34 3.16 28.27 5.15
35 Philippines 32.68 9.73 49.49 3.32
36 Portugal 91.68 17.68 30.18 1.61
37 South Africa 104.21 28.52 152.75 3.45






















































































































(3) Development E±ciency measures the e±ciency of ¯nancial intermediaries and
markets and is de¯ned as the log of the ratio of Equity Value Traded and
Overhead Costs.
(4) Development Aggregate combines the previous three measures and is thus a
conglomerate indicator of the activity, size, and e±ciency of the ¯nancial sector
and it is the ¯rst principal component of the ¯rst three indicators.
(5) Development Dummy equals 0 if both Private Credit and Equity Value Traded
are less than the sample mean and 1 otherwise.o
Table 3 shows the average of ¯nancial development indicators from 1980 to 2014. We
observe that Switzerland is the country with the highest level of ¯nancial activity
with 9.81 followed by United States with 9.75 and Japan with 9.15 points. The lowest
levels of ¯nancial activity are in Honduras, Ghana, and Ecuador with 0, 1.13, and
1.81 points each. We also obtain the ¯nancial development indicators over the period
of 1980–1995 (Table 4) and they are consistent with Beck et al. (2001).
We include Figs. 1 and 2 to observe the variation of the ¯nance–growth nexus
between the ¯rst and the last period of our sample. The ¯gures show the correlation
between ¯nancial activity and economic activity in two periods: 1980–1995 and
1999–2014. In both cases, we use Development Activity (DA) as our ¯nancial de-
velopment indicator. In the ¯rst period (1980–1995), we observe that Ghana and
Honduras and Panama had the lowest levels of ¯nancial development and economic
growth, while in the last period (1999–2014) Ghana and Honduras were still in the
last position, but Panama was replaced by Ecuador. On the other hand, Switzerland,
oPrivate Credit is the value of credits by ¯nancial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP.
Equity Value Traded measures the activity of the stock market trading volume as a share of national
output. Equity Market Capitalization is de¯ned as the value of listed shares divided by GDP. And high
Overhead Costs may re°ect ine±ciencies in the banking system (Beck et al. 2001, p. 196).










39 Sri Lanka 22.05 2.46 16.59 3.74
40 Sweden 98.45 55.24 66.84 1.49
41 Switzerland 141.09 129.00 141.44 1.97
42 Thailand 96.44 31.28 55.82 2.04
43 Trinidad and Tobago 37.92 1.69 47.60 3.96
44 Tunisia 59.96 1.53 12.09 2.56
45 Turkey 21.87 27.11 20.79 4.30
46 United Kingdom 110.35 57.19 95.56 1.77
47 United States 140.39 122.55 91.01 3.18
48 Zimbabwe 19.09 26.08 153.59 12.77
Notes: Private Credit is the value of credits by deposit money banks and other ¯nancial institutions to
the private sector divided by GDP. Equity Stock Traded is the value of total shares traded on the stock
market exchange (both domestic and foreign) divided by GDP. Equity Market Capitalization is the
value of listed domestic shares divided by GDP. Overhead Costs is the accounting value of a bank's
overhead costs as a share of its total assets.

































































































































1 Argentina 0.98 8053 8.24 29.02 233.07 11.60 24.62 1 4 3.7 F
2 Australia 1.79 29,787 11.27 0 4.41 17.83 37.04 1 4 5.9 B
3 Austria 1.65 27,514 8.93 0 2.43 18.88 80.19 3 2 6.0 G
4 Belgium 1.53 27,478 9.59 0 2.43 22.15 130.38 2 0 5.5 F
5 Brazil 1.24 8268 5.08 41.71 335.24 16.51 21.11 1 3 2.8 F
6 Canada 1.35 31,769 10.91 0.0 3.21 21.20 62.09 1 5 6.0 B
7 Chile 3.39 4934 5.64 15.34 11.30 11.67 60.56 2 5 4.6 F
8 China 8.76 348 6.05 53.33 11.30 13.94 37.12 2 3 4.3 G
9 Colombia 1.99 3753 6.03 10.28 16.54 14.23 33.62 0 3 1.4 F
10 Cyprus 2.26 13,165 8.87 4.07 4.44 16.07 114.64 4.5 B
11 Denmark 1.42 36,378 9.66 0 3.20 25.10 79.03 3 2 6.0 S
12 Ecuador 1.18 3687 6.52 32.19 3.20 12.73 47.56 4 2 3.5 F
13 Egypt 2.49 1213 4.21 11.54 10.69 12.79 52.39 4 2 3.4 F
14 Finland 1.83 25,662 8.59 0 3.53 21.33 65.15 1 3 6.0 S
15 France 1.27 26,964 8.38 0 3.11 22.52 48.62 0 3 5.2 F
16 Germany 1.62 26,066 9.83 0 3.11 19.29 57.61 3 1 5.5 G
17 Ghana 1.79 901 5.28 437.34 31.12 11.64 62.79 2.4 B
18 Greece 0.51 19,144 8.36 7.68 9.61 18.67 47.16 1 2 4.1 F
19 Honduras 0.88 1644 4.51 29.63 10.48 13.66 94.31 2.1 F
20 India 4.31 394 3.62 12.09 10.48 11.30 28.11 4 5 3.4 B
21 Ireland 3.38 16,961 10.36 0 4.12 18.00 139.77 1 4 5.5 B
22 Israel 2.02 17,220 11.34 6.98 41.32 28.09 77.83 4 3 4.3 B
23 Italy 1.03 24,452 7.89 0 5.51 18.78 45.31 2 1 5.0 F
24 Jamaica 0.61 3709 7.49 24.24 5.51 14.87 96.50 2.3 B
25 Japan 1.82 25,489 10.17 0.55 0.30 16.28 23.69 2 4 5.4 G
26 Kenya 0.66 898 4.44 17.16 10.69 16.39 56.72 4 3 2.8 B
27 Malaysia 3.57 3309 7.26 1.08 3.48 13.25 160.62 4 4 4.0 B
28 Mexico 0.90 7471 6.30 10.83 3.48 10.77 44.77 0 1 2.7 F
29 Netherlands 1.52 30,078 10.53 0 2.05 22.93 117.06 2 2 6.0 F
30 New Zealand 1.42 22,543 11.50 0 4.77 18.04 57.99 3 4 5.9 B
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32 Pakistan 2.21 556 3.02 12.67 4.70 11.23 34.17 4 5 2.7 B
33 Panama 2.89 4387 7.78 0 2.75 14.95 129.55 2.7 F
34 Peru 1.54 3727 7.29 54.86 306.66 10.83 39.48 0 3 2.5 F
35 Philippines 1.29 1687 6.98 7.57 9.07 9.94 73.43 0 3 2.6 F
36 Portugal 1.73 12,388 5.71 5.68 9.07 17.31 63.42 1 3 5.1 F
37 South Africa 0.55 6603 7.03 2.12 10.82 18.74 52.54 3 5 2.4 B
38 Spain 1.58 17,442 7.92 2.79 5.12 17.11 47.21 2 4 4.8 F
39 Sri Lanka 4.01 927 8.39 14.68 10.85 10.48 69.19 3 3 2.4 B
40 Sweden 1.64 31,094 10.94 0 10.85 25.65 72.16 2 3 6.0 S
41 Switzerland 0.95 54,497 10.89 0 1.89 10.79 93.75 1 2 5.7 G
42 Thailand 4.21 1404 4.66 0.02 3.99 12.94 95.37 3 2 4.1 B
43 Trinidad
and Tobago
1.76 9407 8.62 35.75 6.15 15.10 86.65 3.6 B
44 Tunisia 2.32 2029 4.20 7.41 6.15 16.70 89.03 4.1 F
45 Turkey 2.42 4788 4.91 6.08 44.29 11.60 41.74 2 2 3.8 F
46 United Kingdom 1.75 21,795 9.70 0 4.25 19.09 51.68 4 5 5.6 B
47 United States 1.62 28,734 12.65 0 2.87 15.46 22.79 1 5 5.7 B
48 Zimbabwe −0.39 1146 5.31 57.45 2.87 17.55 68.20 4 3 2.7 B
Notes: We take the Policy Conditioning Information set (initial GDP, schooling, in°ation, black market premium, government and trade) using by
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United States, and Japan had the highest levels of ¯nance and growth in Fig. 1, but
Spain was ranked third in Fig. 2.
A key component of our Financial Development (FD) indicators is Private
Credit, which measures the credit by deposit money banks and other ¯nancial
institutions to the private sector divided by GDP. Levine et al. (2000) explain that
higher levels of Private Credit could be interpreted as higher levels of ¯nancial
services and therefore greater ¯nancial intermediary development. Table 5 shows the
average of Private Credit (% of GDP) from 1980 to 2014. Japan, Switzerland, and
United States have the highest levels of ¯nancial intermediation; meanwhile, Ghana,
Peru, and Mexico have the lowest.
Other important elements to obtain our FD indicators are total value of Equity
Stock Traded (EST) and Equity Market Capitalization (EMC). The ¯rst indicates
the value of total shares traded on the stock market exchange (both domestic and
foreign) divided by GDP and, the second, is de¯ned as the value of listed domestic
shares divided by GDP. Levine & Zervos (1998) suggest that trading volume as a
share of national output should positively re°ect liquidity on an economy-wide basis,
while Equity Market Capitalization is used as an indicator of market development
relative to the economy. In Table 5, we observe that Switzerland, United States, and
United Kingdom provide more liquidity to their economies by the stock market
channel, whereas the size of the stock market reaches the higher levels in Honduras,
South Africa, and Zimbabwe. The above results show that EST and EMC are
measures of the liquidity and the size of the stock market relative to the size of their
Table 7. Descriptive statistics for cross-country data.
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Growth 1.94 1.40 −0.39 8.76 48
Development Activity 6.42 2.20 0.00 9.81 48
Development Size 4.62 0.68 2.87 5.85 48
Development E±ciency 1.50 2.12 −6.28 4.52 48
Development Aggregate 0.00 1.58 −5.02 2.58 48
Development Dummy 0.58 0.50 0.00 1.00 48
Initial GDP pc* 14,592.0 13,749.1 347.9 54,497.5 48
Schooling 7.78 2.46 3.02 12.65 48
Black market premium 0.26 0.71 0.00 3.35 48
In°ation 19.84 63.52 0.00 437.34 48
Government 16.38 4.40 9.94 28.09 48
Trade 66.79 32.43 21.11 160.62 48
Creditor 2.12 1.35 0.00 4.00 41
Anti-director 3.10 1.28 0.00 5.00 41
Rule of law 4.22 1.39 1.42 6.00 48
British origin 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 48
French origin 0.42 0.50 0.00 1.00 48
German origin 0.10 0.31 0.00 1.00 48
Scandinavian origin 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 48
Notes: This table shows the main descriptive statistics for the all variables






















































































































Table 8. Financial development and economic growth IV with all instruments.
IV Regressions. Dependent variable real GDP growth by period
Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
Period [1980–1995] [1981–1996] [1982–1997] [1983–1998] [1984–1999] [1985–2000] [1986–2001] [1987–2002] [1988–2003] [1989–2004]
Development Activity 0.7433*** 0.7845*** 0.6845** 0.6896** 0.7473*** 0.7611*** 0.8293*** 0.8409*** 0.8068** 0.7377**
Development Size 1.9791** 1.6442** 1.4325** 1.5165** 1.6686** 1.6842** 1.8215*** 1.8490** 1.6433** 1.4113**
Development E±ciency 0.6537** 0.7885*** 0.7483** 0.7485** 0.8092*** 0.7958*** 0.8546*** 0.8708*** 0.8785*** 0.8355***
Development Aggregate 1.0486** 0.8570*** 0.7443** 0.7690** 0.8520*** 0.8896*** 0.9950*** 1.0232*** 0.9933** 0.9076**
Development Dummy 2.6041*** 2.2888** 2.1362** 2.3640** 2.4821*** 2.3853** 2.5012*** 2.5099*** 2.7524** 3.1271
Model XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI XVII XVIII XIX XX
Period [1990–2005] [1991–2006] [1992–2007] [1993–2008] [1994–2009] [1995–2010] [1996–2011] [1997–2012] [1998–2013] [1999–2014]
Development Activity 0.7500** 0.7411** 0.7983** 0.7184** 0.7169* 0.7310** 0.6176** 0.5884* 0.6321* 0.6561**
Development Size 1.3602* 1.1826* 1.2745* 1.0988 1.0551* 1.3634* 1.1540* 1.1102* 1.2448* 1.2683*
Development E±ciency 0.8633** 0.9134** 0.9863*** 0.9358** 0.9378* 0.9349** 0.8339** 0.8156** 0.8480** 0.8571**
Development Aggregate 0.9113** 0.8881** 0.9596** 0.8767** 0.8847* 0.9459** 0.8123** 0.7851* 0.8570** 0.9032**
Development Dummy 2.4433** 2.2169** 2.2047* 1.9069* 1.8691* 2.1145** 1.8508* 1.7795* 1.9025* 1.9268*
Notes: All regressions include the policy conditioning information set: logarithm of initial income, schooling, in°ation, black market premium, government size, and
trade openness. We use legal origin dummies (British, French, and German relative to Scandinavian origin), creditor, anti-director, and rule of law as instruments
for ¯nancial development. All regressions pass Wooldridge's (1995) robust score test of overidentifying restrictions.
*Statistical signi¯cance at 10% level.
**Statistical signi¯cance at 5% level.
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Notes: This ¯gure shows the evolution of the relationship between ¯nancial development indicators and real economic growth with IV model (Table 8) with IV
coe±cients. The dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth.
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economies, but these measures should not be interpreted as direct indicators of the
liquidity and size of the market (Beck & Levine 2004).
The last component to construct the Financial Indicator is Overhead Costs,
which is the accounting value of a bank's overhead costs as a share of its total assets.
Beck et al. (2010) describe that higher levels of Overhead Costs indicate lower levels
of banking e±ciency, as banks increase their costs and there is a higher wedge
between lending and deposit interest rates. Ireland, Japan, and Finland have lower
ratios of Overhead Costs and their banking activity is more e±cient than the rest of
the countries (Table 5).
We also detail our set of potential growth determinants for each country
(Table 6). We consider the initial GDP per capita to control for convergence, years of
total schooling to control for the e®ect of human capital accumulation, the average
rate of in°ation as macroeconomic stability, the government size as share of GDP to
proxy for government intrusion, the average black market premium, and the exports
plus imports as share of GDP to capture the degree of openness of economies. We
choose three dummies for legal origin (British, French, and German relative to
Scandinavian origin) and creditor, anti-director, and rule of law as instruments.
Table 7 shows the mean statistics of our cross-country data: mean, standard devi-
ation, minimum., maximum, and the number of observations.
4. Results
Table 8 and 3 present the IV coe±cients for equation (1) with the instruments
mentioned before.p We con¯rm that ¯nancial development is positively correlated
with long-run economic growth over almost all periods of our sample (since 1980–
1995 until 1999–2014). Only in two regressions (of one hundred), our coe±cients
were not statistically signi¯cant (numbers without asterisk). We also con¯rm that
instruments a®ect real per capita GDP growth only through the ¯nancial develop-
ment indicators (coe±cients in bold).
We also ¯nd that creditor, anti-director, rule of law and three dummies for legal
origin (British, French, and German relative to Scandinavian origin) were good
instruments for the ¯nancial structure indicators. Finally, in all regressions, we could
not reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid.
5. Conclusion
We estimate cross-country growth regressions for 48 countries during 20 periods of
15 years starting in 1980 and ending in 2014. We have three main conclusions. First,
the IV coe±cients in Table 8 show that overall ¯nancial development has a positive
pEach coe±cient represents one regression using real GDP growth as dependent variable and considering
the policy conditioning information set: Logarithm of initial income, schooling, in°ation, black market
premium, government size, and trade openness.





















































































































e®ect on economic growth during (almost) all the 20 periods (from 1980–1995 to
1999–2014) and this supports the ¯nancial services view. Second, we con¯rm that
law and ¯nance view is valid in all our sample data, because legal system char-
acteristics are good instruments for the ¯nancial indicators during all periods. Last,
but not the least, our results suggest that ¯nancial development matters for eco-
nomic growth even considering the e®ect of the global ¯nancial crisis.
This research is the initial work of new evidence of the ¯nance–growth nexus
based on rolling windows regressions during the recent decades. We are leaving for
future research a deeper analysis of the ¯nancial structure (bank-based or market-
based) and the ¯nancial crisis e®ect on economic growth. Future research will
hopefully provide more evidence to help explain the mechanism through which
¯nancial development has in°uenced economic growth during recent years.
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